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DIGITAL SIGNATURES COME TO
SOUTH CAROLINA: THE PROPOSED DIGITAL
SIGNATURE ACT OF 1997
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital signatures, encryption, private keys--sound like the script from
"Mission Impossible?"' The technology wave is about to hit South Carolina.
These terms are taken from legislation to be introduced in the 1997 session of
the South Carolina General Assembly.2
The South Carolina Digital Signature Act (DSA) will enable South
Carolina consumers to transact business on-line by using a unique digital
signature and an encryption process that will assure them a level of security
that is now lacking in Internet3 transactions. With the digital signature process
a buyer and a seller or an attorney and a client, for example, can be confident
that a document executed on-lhie has not been altered and that all signatures
are authentic.
Digital signature legislation is sweeping the nation. Utah was the first
state to pass a digital signature act,4 followed closely by Hawaii,5 Califor-
nia,6 Arizona,7 and Washington.' Bills for digital signature acts were
introduced last year in Michigan,9 Georgia,1" Rhode Island, 1 New
York,12 and Virginia. 3
1. MISsION IMPOSSmLE (Paramount Pictures 1996).
2. Draft of Bill creating the Digital Signatures Act, to be codified, if enacted, at S.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 26-5-101 to -504 (unpublished draft as of Sept. 30, 1996, on file with South Carolina
Senate Judiciary Committee) [hereinafter DSA].
3. The Internet currently allows anyone with a computer, a modem, and the proper software
to access the World Wide Web and communicate with virtually any other participating user.
4. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-101 to -504 (Supp. 1996).
5. S.B. 2401, 18th Leg. (Haw. 1995) (effective July 1, 1996) (allocating funding forjudiciary
computers in anticipation of digital signature impact).
6. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16.5 (Deering 1996) (authorizing Secretary of State to write
regulations for digital signatures by January 1, 1997).
7. ARxz. REv. STAT. § 41-121(13) (1996) (requiring secretary of state to approve all digital
signatures).
8. Act of Mar. 29, 1996, 1996 Wash. Legis. Serv. 839 (West) (passing comprehensive digital
signature act similar to the Utah Act).
9. S.B. 939, 88th Leg., 1996 Reg. Sess. (Mich. 1996) (currently in Senate Committee on
Technology and Energy).
10. S. Res. 621, 143d Gen. Assembly, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. (Ga. 1996) (passed in Senate and
currently pending in the House Committee on Rules).
11. H.B. 8125, 1996 Leg. Sess. (R.I. 1996) (currently in House Committee on Judiciary).
12. S.B. 7420, 219th Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 1996) (currently in Senate
1
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Digital signatures were even a hot topic at the 1996 Democratic National
Convention.1 4 While speaking about his state's digital signature act, Utah
Senate Minority Leader Scott Howell prompted a laugh from the audience at
the Democratic Leadership Council by stating, "A lot of people have been
very nervous about this. ... It's the same people who say black helicopters
fly over and there's a third-world conspiracy out there and Big Brother is
involved. Fortunately, we do not have very much of that in Utah .... [T]he
new generation is much more technologically advanced." 5
Digital signatures have the potential to be used in several aspects of
everyday life and, in fact, are already being used to some extent in commerce
and government. The Los Angeles County court system, for example, is
testing electronic filing of legal documents using digital signatures.'
6
American Express, Visa, and MasterCard have all implemented digital
signature technology for on-line transactions.17 Digital signatures integrated
into Smart Cards' s are being used to secure debit card purchases. 19 Law-
makers are granting credence for the use of this technology in electronic funds
transfers, mortgage applications,' and virtually any contract executed on-line
and requiring a valid signature. The Utah legislation provides that a digitally
signed contract is "as valid, enforceable, and effective as if it had been written
on paper. "21
Obviously, the implications for attorneys are tremendous. Digital
signatures will surely raise questions about the statute of frauds. Further, there
are the issues of digital signature "forgery" (or some mode of security
compromise) and the ability to file court documents or serve notice on-line.
The American Bar Association, recognizing the effect this legislation will have
Committee on Judiciary).
13. H.J. Res. 129, 1996 Sess. (Va. 1996) (currently in House Committee on Rules).
14. See Laurie Sullivan Maddox, Utah Demo BragsAbout State's Lead in Government Using
Technology, THE SALT LAKE Tam., Aug. 29, 1996, at A10, available in 1996 WL 3048561.
15. Id.
16. See Wendy R. Leibowitz, Technology and the Law Meet Online Commerce, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 5, 1996, at B1 (discussing how California began testing electronic filing using digital
signatures for probate court cases in May 1996).
17. See AMEXPartners with GTE, TREASURY MANAGER'S REP., Sept. 13, 1996, available
in LEXIS, Legal News and Practice Library, Current News File.
- 18. Smart Cards are electronic cards (similar to credit cards) that contain an individually
encrypted digital signature or password, known as a private key. The cards can be used at
retailers with special terminals that utilize a public key to decrypt the digital signature, verifying
the signature's authenticity.
19. See The Debit Card Security Push Picks Up Speed: Expansion Efforts, DEBrr CARD
NEWS, Apr. 16, 1996, available in LEXIS, Legal News and Practice Library, Current News File.
20. See Strategies Lenders Can Follow to Avoid On-Line Loan Problems, FIN. SERVICES
REP., Jan. 31, 1996, available in LEXIS, Legal News and Practice Library, Current News File.
21. UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-403(1) (Supp. 1996).
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on the legal profession, issued Model Guidelines in August 1996 for states
implementing their own digital signature acts.'
This article gives an overview of digital signature technology and
describes the draft of the bill that will be introduced in South Carolina. It also
discusses some of the issues that have been raised about digital signature
legislation, including security, validity under the statute of frauds, case law (or
lack thereof), and the scope of digital signatures worldwide.
II. How DOES IT WORK?
Several industries have been using electronic signatures for some time.
Personal identification numbers (PINs) used for authorizing transactions at
automated teller machines are a prominent example. Generally, a digital
signature is a kind of electronic identification mark that becomes imposed on
a message or document through the use of special software that actually
encrypts the entire document. Only corresponding software with a special code
can decrypt the message.
The digital signature process involves three components: the subscriber,
the certification authority, and the recipient. The process is analogous to
having a document notarized; a signer, a notary, and a receiver would play
paiallel roles.' The transaction begins, of course, when the subscriber
executes a document. A private key (that uniquely corresponds to a public key)
facilitates the initial signing. Although the term creates an image of slotted and
toothed metal, a "key" is actually just a string of characters. For example, a
40-bit key is a binary number that is forty digits long. Longer, more complex
keys provide better security, but the industry standard is 40-bits.24
The certification authority assigns keys and certifies the validity of each
subscriber's digital signature, just as a notary certifies documents. Certification
authorities also promulgate computerized lists that link subscribers to their
public keys.' The lists themselves are digitally signed so that the certification
authority can be investigated up a chain of higher legal accountability.26
22. See LEGAL INFRASTRUCrURE FOR CERTIFICATION AUTHORITIES AND SECURE
ELECTRONIC COMMERCE (Info. Sec. Comm. of ABA Science & Tech. Section 1996).
23. This is based on examples given in the drafts to the ABA Model Guidelines. See John
B. Kennedy & Shoshana R. Davids, Bartleby the Cryptographer; Legal Profession Prepares for
Digital Signatures, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 22, 1996, at S4.
24. Elizabeth Koch & David Brenner, How Safe is Your E-Mail? USData Encryption Policy,
Bus. TODAY, Fall 1996, at 16, 16.
25. See Kennedy & Davids, supra note 23, at S4. Kennedy and Davids point out that the
private key cannot be surmised through mere possession of the public key and mathematical skill.
See id.
26. A. Michael Froomkin, Innovation and the Information Environment: The EssentialRole
of Trusted Third Parties in Electronic Commerce, 75 OR. L. REv. 49, 56-57 (1996).
1997]
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Forthcoming South Carolina legislation calls for the secretary of state's office
to reside at the top of the chain. The secretary will supervise and license
certification authorities.27
When a subscriber wants a recipient to rely on his digital signature, he
must ask the certification authority to issue a certificate containing his public
key. The subscriber is thereafter responsible for making this certificate
available to potential recipients. Wider availability can be accomplished
through publication in a repository of digital signatures. Special software then
"reads" a document and "signs" it with a string of electronic numbers known
only to the person signing the document-his private key. For longer docu-
ments, the signatory process is made easier when the document is first
converted to a hash result.2" The entire process is quite simple for the
subscriber, who merely clicks an on-screen icon. The software performs the
encryption process.
Once the message is received (in plain text and with a digital signature
affixed), it is again a simple matter for the recipient to generate the character-
istic hash result. To verify authenticity the recipient must use the public key
to decrypt the digital signature and then check that the hashes are the same.
Different hash marks indicate that a private key other than the one certified
was used to encrypt the hash result (or document) or that the document was
changed between execution and verification. On the other hand, "if everything
matches, the recipient can be reasonably confident that the subscriber actually
executed the document."29
m. DIGITAL SIGNATURE SECURIrY
Security is both an advantage and a disadvantage of digital signatures. The
Internet is currently an open network. Consumers purchasing goods or
executing documents on-line risk having hackers pull their credit card numbers
off the Internet or tamper with transmitted documents and e-mail. The FBI
estimates that eighty percent of computer crime it investigates is perpetrated
over the Internet.3" The advantage is clear. Digital signatures provide
essential security and allow consumers the ability to more confidently transact
business on-line.
27. Letter from Stephen T. Draffin, South Carolina Legislative Council, to author (Sept. 10,
1996) (on file with author) [hereinafter Draffin letter].
28. A hash result is a sort of condensed version or "digest" of the original message. It is
created by a mathematical algorithm in a manner that retains the uniqueness of the original
message. A shorter hast result is better suited to encryption. Kennedy & Davids, supra note 23,
at S4 n.14.
29. Id. at S4.
30. Froomkin, supra note 26, at 49 (citing DAvD Icov Er AL., COMPUTER CRIME: A
CRIMEFIGHTER'S HANDBOOK 129 (1995)).
[Vol. 48:427
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One disadvantage is the concern over reliability of the signatures and the
uniqueness of private and public keys. The system has no inherent feature to
prevent tampering with or theft of private keys. A private key is only as
secure as its holder keeps it.31 The Utah statute protects the subscriber's
private key as personal property, meaning that theft or unauthorized use of a
private key is subject to criminal and civil liability. 32 The South Carolina bill
is expected to provide similar measures.33
Another concern is the security of the certification authority, which issues
the public and private keys and certifies their authenticity. The certification
authority innately has access to sensitive information, and confidentiality is
essential. Moreover, the certification authority must have internal controls in
place to regulate access to its list of public keys.34 To ensure the necessary
level of sophistication, proposed South Carolina legislation would allow only
attorneys, financial institutions, title insurance companies, and certain
government agencies to serve as certification authorities.35 The South
Carolina draft further would require certification authorities to undergo yearly
compliance audits. Certified public accountants with expertise in computer
security would conduct these audits.36 In addition, the South Carolina draft
would mandate implied warranties by the certification authority to any person
reasonably relying on verification of digital signatures. 37 These warranties
may not be limited or disclaimed by contract. 3' To protect the certification
authority, however, the draft would charge private key owners with the
responsibility of keeping their private keys confidential.39
To counter some of the risk, authorities can have certification security
measures built into the encryption process. For example, the certificates
authorizing digital signatures can be made time-sensitive by a stamping
procedure. 4' This would allow a receiver to rely on the time-stamp for
prioritizing documents or determining whether documents were filed within a
deadline. Time coding also would allow a user to trace a document to the time
it was encrypted. A time-stamp will serve as "prima facie evidence that the
31. Kennedy & Davids, supra note 23, at S4.
32. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 46-3-305 (Supp. 1996).
33. Draffin letter, supra note 27.
34. See Froomkin, supra note 26, at 62-63.
35. See DSA, supra note 2, § 5-201(A).
36. See id. § 5-202(A).
37. See DSA, supra note 2, § 5-304(A)(1); see also Kennedy & Davids, supra note 23, at
S4 (discussing the ABA Draft Guidelines).
38. See DSA, supra note 2, § 5-304(A)(2).
39. See id. § 5-303(A).
40. See id. § 5-401(D)(1).
1997]
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time-stamped signature took effect as of the date and time indicated in the
time-stamp. 41
As a further measure, digital signatures can be revoked.42 The user, an
immediate family member, or a business associate, agent, or employee of the
user can suspend a certificate in an instant.43 Much like the process for
cancelling a credit card, the certification authority would suspend a license
without confirming the identity of the person requesting the suspension.
44
Immediately upon suspension, the certification authority would be required to
publish a notice in all repositories that contained the certificate.4' An
unauthorized person who requests suspension would be guilty of a misde-
meanor and would incur a fine or imprisonment.46
Business conducted with digital signatures would also be subject to
reliance limits, such as total transaction value.4' That is, a user could set his
own reliance limit when applying to the certification authority: "By specifying
a recommended reliance limit in a certificate, the issuing certification authority
and accepting subscriber recommend that persons rely on the certificate only
in transactions in which the total amount at risk does not exceed the recom-
mended reliance limit."
48
IV. VALIDITY OF DIGITAL SIGNATURES
Another concern is the validity of the signature on a legal document.
South Carolina's draft declares that "[a] digitally signed document is as valid
as if it had been written on paper. "41 Further, the draft explicitly includes a
presumption that the digital signature would be valid and binding:
A digital signature verified using a public key is presumed to have
been affixed with the intention of the subscriber to authenticate the
message and to be bound by the contents of the message if:
(1) the public key is listed in a certificate that is in the repository
provided by the division, or a recognized repository; and
(2) the certificate was not revoked, suspended, or expired at the time
of signature.5°
41. Id.
42. See id. § 5-305.
43. See id. § 5-305(A)(1)(a).
44. See id. § 5-305(A)(2).
45. See id. § 5-305(C)(1).
46. See id. § 5-305(F)(2).
47. See id. § 5-308(A).
48. Id.
49. Id. § 5-402(A).
50. Id. § 5-401(C).
[Vol. 48:427
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The draft also discusses how the presumption could be rebutted:
(1) by evidence indicating that a digital signature cannot be verified by
reference to a certificate issued by a licensed certification authority;
(2) by evidence that the rightful holder of the private key by which the
digital signature was affixed had lost exclusive control of the private key,
without violating any duty imposed by this chapter, at the time when the
digital signature was affixed;
(3) by evidence showing a lack of signature at common law; or
(4) by a showing that reliance on the presumption was not commer-
cially reasonable under the circumstances.
V. STATUTE OF FRAUD
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code requires that certain
transactions be memorialized in a writing signed by the party to be charged.52
The UCC defines signatures as "any symbol executed or adopted by a party
with present intention to authenticate a writing." 53 The Official Comment
indicates that the statute was "intended to make it possible for the law
embodied in this Act to be developed by the courts in light of the unforeseen
and new circumstances and practices. " ' Clearly, the UCC's authors
anticipated technological advancement. Their broad language was meant to
include future methods of "writing."
Forward-looking intent is further evidenced by current actions of the
American Law Institute, the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, and advisers from the ABA, who are redrafting Article
2 to accommodate electronic commerce. 55 ABA Electronic Commerce
Division's chairman, Thomas Smedinghoff, applauds the redraft: "Digital
signatures are the key to electronic commerce.., and the revisions to 2B will
facilitate the use of digital signatures."56 The draft is expected to be approved
in July 1997. It will then be submitted to state legislatures for adaptation to
existing state laws.57
51. Id. § 5-401(E).
52. See U.C.C. § 2-201 (1995).
53. Id. § 1-102 (39). South Carolina has adopted similar language defining a signature as
including "any word or mark used in lieu of a written signature." S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-3-401(2)
(Law. Co-op. 1976).
54. U.C.C. § 1-102 cmt. 1 (1995).
55. See Leibowitz, supra note 16, at B1; see also Marc. E. Szafran, Note, A Neo-Institutional
Paradigm for Contracts Formed in Cyberspace: Judgment Day for the Statute of Frauds, 14
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 491, 498 & n.33 (1996).




Tinnes: Digital Signatures Come to South Carolina: The Proposed Digital S
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW[
VI. CURRENT CASE LAW
Currently, no case law specifically supports a digital signature as binding.
The closest the courts have come to dealing with electronic signatures have
been cases concerning electronic documents such as facsimiles (faxes), telexes,
telegrams and computer verifications. On these factual grounds, the courts are
split.
Some courts have found that signatures transmitted electronically are
binding. For example, a Pennsylvania court, in Hessenthaler v. Farzin,58 held
that a mailgram constituted a writing for the purpose of satisfying the statute
of frauds. The Hessenthaler court posed the issue as whether there was "some
reliable indication that the person to be charged with performing under the
writing intended to authenticate it."59 In WPP Group USA, Inc. v. The
Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc.,6 a New York court held that the
subscription requirement of the statute of frauds was met by an unsigned
legend on a fax. A New Jersey court, in Spevack, Cameron & Boyd v.
National Community Bank of N.J.,61 found that a unique bank account
number sent on-line is as complete a signature as a depositor's written name.
The Spevack court noted: "In this computer age the use of numbers as a means
of identification has become pervasive. Indeed, numbers are more readily
recognized and handled than signatures. . . . The 'signature' accurately
identified the payee ... "62
Other courts, however, have refused to recognize a binding power in
electronic documents or communications. One court refused to allow reliance
on a telex sent by a bank.63 Another held that a computer assigned tracking
number issued in response to a telephoned offer to buy did not constitute
acceptance. ' Still a third held that a name on a telegram did not constitute
a signature under the statute of frauds.'
Fourth Circuit courts have addressed electronic communication in the area
of service of process and the filing of court documents. A federal district court
in North Carolina determined that service by fax does not meet the require-
58. 564 A.2d 990 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
59. Id. at 993.
60. 644 N.Y.S.2d 205 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996).
61. 677 A.2d 1168 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996).
62. Id. at 1169.
63. See Quatar Nat'l Navigation & Transp. Co., Ltd. v. Citibank, N.A., No. 89 Civ. 464
(CSH), 1996 WL 54382 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 9, 1996).
64. See Corinthian Pharm. Sys., Inc. v. Lederle Lab., 724 F. Supp. 605, 610 (S.D. Ind.
1989).
65. See Pike Indus., Inc. v. Middlebury Assocs., 398 A.2d 280, 282 (Vt. 1979).
[Vol. 48:427
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ments of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5(b).' The court decided to leave
the matter to the rulemakers:
The decision today that the new technology of fax transmissions does
not constitute service under Rule 5(b) is not a criticism of the technology.
Rather, it is recognition that this and related new technology would be
better integrated in to the civil rules through the collegial process of a rules
committee, which can obtain and consider a broader range of suggestions
and opinions. 67
In a more recent case, a district court in South Carolina declined to adopt
the "receipt rule" 68 in a removal action because, among other reasons,
formidable questions regarding electronic communications would be raised.
69
The court pointed out that "[c]ourtesy copies, faxes, and e-mail delivered to
whomever picks up the mail, receives the fax, or turns on the computer is not
an inherently fair method to put a defendant on notice of the date on which the
removal time period has begun."7'
The Fourth Circuit, however, does permit filings by fax. In accordance
with the Federal Rules, which allow electronic filings subject to local rules,"




The process of digital execution has international ramifications. The
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) has
proposed legal guidelines for uniformity in international electronic com-
merce.7' The ABA's Section of Science and Technology has worked with the
66. See Salley v. Board of Governors, 136 F.R.D. 417 (M.D.N.C. 1991); see also FED. R.
CIV. P. 5(b) (discussing service and filing of pleadings and other papers).
67. Salley, 136 F.R.D. at 420 n.2.
68. "The 'receipt rule' requires that a defendant must remove a state action to federal court
within thirty days of receipt of a copy of the initial pleadings, without regard to whether service
has been effected." Bowman v. Weeks Marine, Inc., 936 F. Supp. 329, 332 (D.S.C. 1996).
69. See id. at 339.
70. Id. at 342.
71. See FED. R. APP. P. 25(a)(2)(D).
72. See FED. R. APP. P. 25, Local Rule 25(b)(1) (suggesting that attorneys fax to a printing
service in Richmond, which will accept papers by fax and file them with the court--filings can
be faxed to the clerk only in emergency situations with advance permission.) Although Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 5(e) allows filing by facsimile or other electronic means if authorized by
the local rules, the South Carolina district court has not provided such a rule.
73. See Richard Hill & Ian Walden, The Draft UNCITRAL Model Law for Electronic
Commerce: Issues and Solutions, 13 COMPUTER LAw., Mar. 1996, at 18, 18.
1997]
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notarial bars of Western European countries, Mexico, the Province of Quebec,
and the United States State Department to create CyberNotaries that would
electronically certify transactions under United States and foreign law.74
The broad application of this technology has created some controversy.
Encryption software is considered a munition under the International Traffic
in Arms Regulations (ITAR).75 As such, exporting encryption software is
banned under ITAR.76 In one instance, the United States government
investigated an encryption software inventor for twenty-eight months because
he made software available to citizens knowing that they would post it on the
Internet where foreign nationals could access it.' The charges, however,
were eventually dropped. In another case the State Department advised a
cryptographer to obtain a license from the State Department before publishing
a scientific paper describing his cryptographic algorithm. 78 The State
Department later withdrew its order. Before worldwide digital signatures can
be effective, these concerns must be addressed.
VIII. CONCLUSION
South Carolina is ready for digital signature technology. As more and
more commerce is carried out on the Internet the need for greater security is
essential. Digital signatures and electronic commerce promote efficiency and
economy of data transfer and document execution.
Certainly, there are issues yet to be addressed. Private key security and
public/private key pairing confidentiality are the most pressing matters. The
proposed South Carolina legislation has foreseen these concerns and provided
that only certain sophisticated groups may be certification authorities who can
assign pairs. These certification authorities must undergo yearly compliance
audits to ensure that they are following specified internal controls. Also, a
digitally executed document is time-sensitive and subject to reliance limits set
by its author. In addition, a private key may be revoked at any time at the
option of its owner.
74. See Michele C. Kane, Addressing Implications of Digital Signatures, NAT'L L.J., July
10, 1996, at D13.
75. See 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (1996).
76. See id. § 121.8. The statutory authority for ITAR, id. § 120.1-130, is the Arms Export
Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1994). See Edward J. Radlo, Legal Issues in Cryptography, 13
THE COMPUTER LAW., May 1996, at 1, 4; see also William J. Cook, Export Probliems Deliver
Cryptic Message about Encryption, CHICAGO LAWYER, Sept. 1996, at 74, 74.
77. See Radio, supra note 76, at 7 (discussing the federal grand jury investigation of Phil
Zimmermann).
78. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, No. C-95-0582 MHP, 1996 WL 730283
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 1996); Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426 (N.D.
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Digital signatures also bring up the question of the writing requirement
under the statute of frauds. The South Carolina DSA explicitly sets out a
presumption that a document executed with a digital signature is valid as if
written on paper. Currently, the American Law Institute and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws are in the process of
redrafting Article 2 of the UCC to accommodate electronic commerce.
There is very little case law in this emerging area of electronic commerce.
Most cases deal with faxes or telexes. Some courts have addressed electronic
communication on a limited basis by allowing filing via computer. Digital
signature technology will likely lead to a whole new area of case law, and the
South Carolina courts must be equipped to meet the demand.
The American Bar Association and state legislatures have recognized the
need for this legislation. The drafters of Article 2 have anticipated the trend
toward electronic commerce. Even the United Nations has addressed
cryptology issues. The General Assembly should be commended for keeping
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